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This paper assesses the effect of transition from monthly distribution of free food grains 
to the daily provision of free cooked meals to school children on enrollments and attendance in a 
rural area of India. School panel data allow a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to 
address possible endogeneity of program placement. The results suggest that program transition 
had a significant impact on improving the daily participation rates of children in lower grades. 
The average monthly attendance rate of girls in grade 1 was more than 12 percentage points 
higher while there was a positive but insignificant effect on grade 1 boys’ attendance rate. The 
impact on enrollment levels was insignificant.  
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1  Introduction  
This study evaluates the impact of a nationally mandated program of providing free school meals 
on  improving  participation  rates  of  primary  school  age  children  in  a  rural  area  of  India. 
Universalization of primary schooling by 2015 is one of the eight Millennium Development 
Goals adopted at the United Nations (UN) Summit in 2000. Assessment of the progress made 
since shows that South Asia, besides sub-Saharan Africa, is lagging behind in attaining this 
objective (Glewwe and Zhao, 2006). With almost 70% of the primary school age population in 
the region coming from India, the country‟s poor performance has been a primary driver of the 
slow  progress  made  since  the  UN  declaration  (Glewwe  and  Zhao,  2006).  Ironically,  the 
elementary  education  system  of  India  is  one  of  the  largest  in  the  world.
1  But despite its 
seemingly extensive coverage almost 40 million children  do not reach grade 5 (Government of 
India, Department of Education, 2003). Dropout rates are high and primary school completion in 
1998-99 was a mere 58.2% (National Family Health Survey (NFHS), 1998-99).  
As in most developing countries, one of the key re asons cited for low levels of school 
participation in India is the cost, including the opportunity cost, of education (NFHS, 1998 -99). 
Although tuition in public primary schools is negligible and almost completely subsidized, the 
overhead costs of books and uniforms can be quite high, dissuading poor families from sending 
their children to school (Public Report on Basic Education for India (PROBE) Team, 1999).
2 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, both survey and experimental studies suggest that programs, which 
reduce  the  cost  of  schooling,  can  be   effective  means  of  improving  participation  rates  in 
developing countries (conditional  cash  transfer  programs:  Schultz  (2004)  and  Morley  and 
Coady (2003); free uniforms and textbooks: Kremer et al. (2002); raw food grains program: 
Ravallion  and  Wodon  (2000)).  However,  enrollment  is  a  noisy  measure  of  participation,   4 
especially in developing countries. Daily school participation may be lower than suggested by 
enrollment levels. Although data on daily attendance is virtually absent in India, some evidence 
suggests that there is significant student absenteeism.
3 Low attendance rates can be attributed to 
poor quality of schooling as well as to household financial constraints.
4 Improvements in daily 
attendance could, arguably, raise academic performance and thereby reduce dropout rates and 
improve primary school completion rates. In recent years, therefore, there has been growing 
emphasis on providing free school meals as a targeted in-kind transfer.  
Given the anticipated benefits of such a scheme, the  National Program of Nutritional 
Support to Primary Education (or the Mid-day Meal Scheme) was launched in India in 1995. The 
scheme entitles each enrolled child to a meal, which does not vary in quantity or content across 
grades and gender, on the school premises each school day. The program currently benefits 120 
million primary school children across the country making it one of the largest school feeding 
programs in the world.
5 
This paper studies the impact of transition of the sch eme from a take-home program 
(monthly provision of free, raw foodgrains) to its current form of providing free cooked meals on 
school participation in a rural area of India. It attempts to provide new policy insights in two 
ways. First, despite the growing emphasis on provision of cooked school meals, the evidence on 
its impact on participation in India (and of similar programs in other developing countries), 
particularly in comparison to a relatively less expensive take -home program, is startlingly 
meager.
6 In a rare survey study of the effect of school quality on participation in rural India, 
Dreze and Kingdon (2000) find that provision of mid-day school meals increased enrollment of 
girls but not of boys in primary schools.  However, their result has to b e interpreted cautiously 
since the authors did not address the issue of endogeneity of program placement. A few studies 5 
 
for other developing countries  also  indicate a positive participation impact  (Vermeersch and 
Kremer, 2005; Ahmed, 2004) of school meals. Second, while enrollment has been the focus of 
most  research  on  this  scheme,  school  meal  programs  are  also  directed  at  the  poor  daily 
attendance of students.
7 In a scenario where enrollment does not necessarily imply daily presence 
in school, enrollment outcomes might not provide a complete picture of the effect of providing 
free meals on participation rates.      
The  study  utilizes school panel data collected in a rural area of India. I t  adopts  a 
difference-in-differences estimation strategy, comparing th e difference in participation before 
and after the introduction of the program in schools that transitioned from providing free food 
grains to serving cooked meals within the first six months of a new academic year to that of a 
control group whose program participation status did not change during this period. This allows 
us to control for time invariant unobservables that are correlated with program placement and 
participation.  
To provide a  brief  overview of  the results  -  there  was  a  significant  effect  of   the 
introduction of cooked school meals on daily school participation, particularly of girls and of 
children in lower grades. The average monthly attendance rate of grade 1 girls was more than 12 
percentage points higher due to program transition. There is a positive but insignificant impact of 
the scheme on the attendance rate of boys in grade 1. The impact on attendance of girls and boys 
in high grades is insignificant. The results also suggest that the on-site school meal program had 
an insignificant effect on enrollment levels.  
    The paper begins with a brief discussion of the expected response of beneficiary 
households  to  the  transition  in  the  nature  of  the  school  meal  program.  The  institutional 
characteristics of the meal program in the survey regi on are described in section 3. Section 4   6 
provides  details  on  the  data  and  methodology  used  in  estimating  the  impact  of  program 
transition. The results are presented in section 5. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes. 
2  Response of households to school meals  
Distribution of free food grains and the provision of cooked meals in schools may impact the 
incentives of potential beneficiaries differently. The distribution of free food grains in the survey 
areas was once a month and was, in practice, conditional on student enrollment. The uptake of 
the cooked meals program is conditional on enrollment and daily attendance since meals are 
served on-site. The net impact of this change in program characteristic (assuming that the value 
of the transfer per month per child is the same in both programs and school quality remains 
unchanged)  on  individuals‟  school  participation  depends  on  the  behavioural  response  of 
households to this transition. 
The raw foodgrains program allowed for sharing of the transfer among family members 
but the on-site cooked meals program is targeted at the child potentially reducing leakage of 
benefits to other household members. If households reallocate food at home in response to the 
provision of on-site school meals there could be comparable effects of the two types of programs 
on children‟s school enrollment. A second reason for non-effect of program transition could be 
that the opportunity costs of sending a child to school may be substantive for families that need 
to choose between schooling and engagement in productive labour. This choice could be more 
stark for older children. In such a case the on-site program may not provide any  additional 
incentives for enrollments. Daily participation could also be unaffected if the opportunity costs 
of regular presence in school is higher than the implicit program subsidy.  
Alternately, there could be two reasons for a positive participation effect. First, if the 
scheme creates a „labeling‟ effect (Kooreman, 2000) and there is no reallocation of household 7 
 
resources away from the program beneficiary, cooked meals may provide greater enrollment and 
daily participation incentive if parents perceive the program as improving the health and learning 
outcomes  of the targeted child. Second, if the transition from  take-home to  on-site program 
results in the child (as against other household members) receiving most of the transfer (Afridi, 
2009), the attraction of a meal in school could, through child agency, make it easier for parents to 
induce the child to attend school more regularly. Similarly lower opportunity costs of school 
attendance due to daily meal provision could increase parental incentives for ensuring the child‟s 
presence in school (Ravallion and Wodon, 2000).  
To sum, participation may be unchanged or increase due to program transition. Since 
some of these conflicting responses could be simultaneous, the net impact of the transition on 
enrollments and daily attendance is an empirical question. 
3  Background  
A.  The school feeding program in India 
The National Program of Nutritional Support to Primary Education was initiated by the federal 
government  of  India  in  August  1995  (Government  of  India,  1995).  The  program  mandated 
provision of free meals in all public primary schools (not in private primary schools) across the 
country. Every child enrolled in grades 1 to 5 was to be served wheat porridge (sweet and salty, 
on alternate days) cooked from 100 grams of raw wheat or rice on the school premises during the 
school  lunch  break  (or  mid-day  and  hence  also  called  the  mid  day  meal  (MDM)  program), 
providing 413.80 kcal and 8.20 grams of protein. The state governments were responsible for 
financing  the  cost  of  converting  food  grains,  provided  free  by  the  federal  government,  into 
cooked meals. States that could not raise resources were allowed, in the interim, to distribute free 
grain rations to each enrolled child at the rate of 3 kilograms per school month conditional on a   8 
minimum monthly attendance of 80% per student. However, this conditionality was not strictly 
imposed. A Supreme Court of India judgment in 2001 directed all state governments, which were 
yet to implement the program, to provide cooked meals in all targeted schools within six months. 
B.  The school feeding program in the survey region  
This paper draws upon survey data collected in one of the eleven census blocks of Chindwara 
district in Madhya Pradesh (MP) in 2004.
8 MP is one of the most underdeveloped states in the 
country, in terms of both poverty ratios and educational attainment. According to the National 
Sample Survey (NSS), 11% of all children between 6 to 11 years who were not in school in 
1999-2000 in India were in Madhya Pradesh. During the same period rural poverty in MP was 
30% (Deaton and Dreze, 2002), 4 percentage points higher than the average rural poverty in the 
country.  The  potential  impact  of  a  school  subsidy  program  in  this  region  can,  therefore,  be 
substantial. 
Chindwara,  located  in  south  central  MP,  is  one  of  the  largest  in  the  state  with  a 
population of almost 2 million in 2001.  The surveyed block is one of the officially designated 
120 economically deprived census blocks in the state. In this block public primary schools were 
distributing grain rations to all enrolled students up until April 2003, despite the court verdict 
mandating cooked school meals in 2001. Although most public schools here transitioned from 
distributing food grains to providing meals in school in July 2003 (the first month of a new 
academic year), some continued to distribute wheat grains at the rate of 2 kilograms per student 
per school month even after July. This quantity of food grains was equivalent to the 100 grams of 
wheat provided under the cooked meal program on a school day (i.e. a school year comprises of 
10 school months each containing 20 school days on average).  9 
 
The administrative and financial responsibility of implementing the meal program in all 
public primary schools in a village in MP lay with the elected village governing body or GP 
(Gram Panchayat).
9 Under the guidelines of the state government of MP, GPs were expected to 
use funds obtained through devolution of revenue collected by state governments to finance the 
school meal program. Thus, the implementation of the school meal scheme may have been 
endogenous to that particular village or community due to the institutional characteristics of the 
program. 
4  Empirical analysis  
A.   Data  
41 of the 150 villages in the census block were randomly selected for a school survey. Within 
each village all public and private primary schools were surveyed during an unannounced visit in 
January and February 2004 for information on the school meal program, student participation 
and school infrastructure. In total, information was obtained for 74 primary school, including 10 
private  schools  in  the  selected  census  block.  For  the  purpose  of  the  analysis  the  sample  is 
restricted to the public primary schools only.
10  
Within  each  school  aggregate  participation  data  on  enrollment  and  attendance  was 
obtained at the grade and gender level from official school registers for two school months, July 
and December 2003. The enrollment level was obtained by counting the total number of students 
listed in the school register in a grade by gender in that month. The average monthly attendance 
rate was calculated by first computing the average number of attendees on a school day in that 
month (by grade and gender) or the average monthly attendance level. This was obtained by 
summing the total number of attendees on each school day in that month and dividing it by the   10 
total number of days school was held in that month. The average monthly attendance rate then is 
the average attendance level over the enrollment level in that month (in percentage terms).   
Besides the participation data, information was gathered on the timing of the transition 
from  monthly distribution of raw food  grains  to  daily provision of cooked meals  on school 
premises. Of the 64 public primary schools, 41 schools implemented the cooked school meal 
program after July and before December, 2003 (22 implemented the program in August, 7 in 
September, 9 in October and 3 in November 2003). These schools were distributing raw food 
grains in July and transitioned to serving cooked meals before December. The remaining 23 
schools did not change their implementation status during this period. This group includes 17 
schools which implemented the cooked meal program in July and continued providing cooked 
meals through December. 6 schools did not have a cooked school meal program in either July or 
December.  Of  these,  3  schools  were  not  serving  cooked  meals  in  either  month  but  were 
distributing  foodgrains  and  3  schools  were  not  even  distributing  foodgrains.  Details  on  the 
number  of  teachers  and  physical  infrastructure,  such  as  functional  toilet  and  drinking  water 
facility, were also obtained for each school in January and February 2004. 
B.      Estimation strategy 
The ideal estimation strategy for evaluating the impact of the cooked meal scheme on school 
participation would be randomization of program participation at the individual level. But since 
the scheme was mandated for all public primary schools, randomization of program participation 
at the individual or even school level was not possible. However not all public primary schools 
in  the  survey  region  had  implemented  the  program  at  the  same  time.  The  staggered 
implementation of the school meal program from the beginning of the academic year in July 
2003 makes possible a before and after comparison of school enrollment and attendance between 11 
 
schools which transitioned from providing raw food grains to cooked meals earlier to those that 
transitioned  later  in  the  first  6  months  of  the academic  year.    This  difference-in-differences 
strategy is able to account for possible endogenous program placement by eliminating any time 
invariant unobservable characteristics that might be systematically related to implementation of 
the school meal program and school participation.
11 
The  39  treatment  schools  which  were  late  switchers  to  cooked  meals  program 
(participation in the meal program changed between July and December) comprise the treatment 
group. The 17 schools which were early switchers to cooked meals program, since they began 
providing cooked school meals in July itself and continued with the program, comprise the 
control group. Given that the trends in the 6  schools without the cooked meal program in both 
months are likely to be very different from the other schools, these schools were excluded from 
the study. Since all schools implementing cooked meals in December provided food grains in 
July  (treatment)  or  cooked  meals  in  July  (control),  the  outlined  empirical  strategy  allows 
comparison of early switchers to late switchers to identify impact of program transition.
12 
The estimating equation is given by, 
    0 1 2 3 4 ** gcst s t s t s t gcst A D D D D D             X                        
gcst A
 is the aggregate participation rate of gender g in grade c in school s in month t. Ds
 is a 
dummy variable for a treatment school. Dt is a dummy variable for the month - 0 for July and 1 
for  December.  Xs  is  a  vector  of  aggregate  school  level  characteristics  that  may  impact 
participation  –  pupil-teacher  ratio  at  baseline  (July),  blackboards  per  grade,  drinking  water  on 
premises, functional toilet for girls and overall school enrollment level and attendance rate in 
July. For instance, if initial pupil teacher ratios are much worse in the control group schools they 
would have greater drop-out rates relative to the treatment schools and lead to the incorrect   12 
conclusion that program transition reduced drop-outs. But since these school characteristics do 
not vary between July and December, 2003 they would drop out of the difference-in-difference 
analysis. Therefore, each school characteristic is interacted with Dt to control for the possibility 
that they influence program participation.   gcst  is a time varying error term. The coefficient on 
* st DD , then, is the difference-in-differences estimate of the impact of providing cooked school 
meals on the average participation rate.      
C.  Validity of estimation strategy 
There  are  three  concerns  regarding  the  validity  of  the  outlined  empirical  strategy.  First,  the 
source  of  variation  in  the  implementation  of  the  cooked  school  meal  program  may  not  be 
independent of time trends in participation. Although there is no rigorous evidence available on 
any systematic reason for the staggered program implementation, some evidence suggests that 
disadvantaged regions or villages may have implemented the program earlier – (1) the Supreme 
Court of India order of 2001 directs that the school meal program should be implemented in the 
order of poverty in districts in a state
13; (2) findings of the PROBE survey (1999) also suggest 
that school meals were more likely to be targeted at disadvantaged ar eas. A regression of 
provision of school meal on village characteristics yields a negative coefficient for the village 
development index and a positive coefficient for distance from the nearest road by Dreze and 
Kingdon (2000). (3) A regression of month of implementation of school meal on the sample of 
schools‟  village  level  characteristics  using  the  survey  data  reveals  that  villages  with  less 
irrigation facility, farther from the nearest city (census block headquarter) and with a scheduled 
tribe  (socio-economically  disadvantaged  community)  GP  president  were  more  likely  to 
implement the program earlier.
 14 However, none of these coefficients are statistically significant. 
Since schools in disadvantaged areas with typically low participation rates were more likely to 13 
 
fall  in  the  control  group  and  were  more  likely  to  see  improvements  in  participation  post-
transition, the strategy adopted here would lead to downward biased estimates of impact of the 
transition to cooked meals program. Thus even if the timing of the program‟s transition can be 
linked systematically to participation trends, it would go against finding a program impact.  
A second concern is regarding comparability of the control and treatment groups. Table 1 
describes the control and treatment groups of schools in detail. A comparison of observable 
school characteristics of the two groups shows no statistically significant difference between any 
of the observable characteristics for which data are available in column 3 of Table 1. As a further 
test of comparability of the two groups of schools, Figures 1-4 show the average monthly school 
attendance rates for the same sample of schools in July and December of 2003-04. Figures 1-2 
depict the attendance rates for boys in grades 1 to 5 while Figures 3-4 are for girls. Across the 
two months and groups, the attendance rate in grade one is lower than the upper grades. The 
attendance rates tend to rise from grade one to two and then decline, particularly for girls in July. 
Typically, first and fifth grade attendance rate jumps up for both boys and girls, more strongly 
for the latter, in December compared to July. Though the trends in attendance differ between 
July and December, they are similar across the two groups of schools and thus comparable across 
the  treatment  and  control  public  primary  schools.  Unfortunately,  pre-treatment  data,  which 
would provide more reliable comparison of time trends in participation in the two school groups, 
are not available. 
Finally, in developing countries public school records of enrollment and attendance are 
often suspected of being inflated. What is not clear, however, is whether this exaggeration is at 
the school level or at a higher level of aggregation. In order to check the validity of the school 
records the surveyors in this study were asked to match their own count of students with the   14 
attendance recorded for the day of their unannounced visit.
15 The correlation between surveyors‟ 
own count and the attendance record is 0.98. This suggests that the official school records were 
mostly reliable. Furthermore, a difference-in-differences strategy will be able to correct for any 
bias in the records if there is no change in the degree of incentive to inflate participation figures 
before and after the introduction of the meal program in the treatment schools. There are two 
very compelling reasons to believe that this assumption holds. First, food grains were being 
released to the schools at the beginning of a month based on the enrollment figures, and not the 
average attendance, in the previous month in the survey region. Second, almost all public schools 
were  distributing  raw  food  grains  before  the  introduction  of  the  cooked  meal  program.  All 
schools were directed to implement the program from July onwards and, therefore, the quantity 
of grains released at the rate of 2 kilograms per child per month was the same irrespective of 
whether the school was implementing the cooked meal program or distributing raw food grains. 
Thus  there  should  be  no  differential  incentive  between  treatment  and  control  schools  to 
exaggerate  the  enrollment  records  either.  Since  the  nature  of  the  program  is  unlikely  to  be 
correlated with the either the level or direction of the fudging of school records,  3   should give a 
true estimate of program impact. However, if the degree of inflation is so large that it leaves little 
scope  for  a  possible  increase  after  program  implementation,  the  impact  of  the  school  meal 
program on school participation would be biased downwards. 
5  Results 
A.   Impact of school meals on daily attendance 
We begin with assessing the impact of program transition on school attendance as an indicator of 
participation in Table 2. Each column shows separate regressions of the total, boys‟ and girls‟ 
average monthly attendance rate on schools‟ participation in the cooked meal program. The first 15 
 
row  reports  the  coefficient  for  the  difference-in-differences  (DID)  estimate  of  impact  of  the 
transition. There is a positive but insignificant effect of implementation of the cooked meals 
program on attendance rates overall and by gender as indicated by the coefficients on the DID 
term in row one of Table 2. The point estimate of the DID effect for girls is larger in magnitude 
than for boys. In schools, which transitioned late, the attendance rates were insignificantly lower, 
as suggested by the negative coefficients on „participation in cooked meal program after July‟ for 
all groups. However, the significantly negative point estimates for December along with the DID 
estimates  may  indicate  that  lower  attendance  rates  in  December,  relative  to  July,  could  be 
stemmed by the introduction of the cooked school meal program. The positive coefficient on the 
interaction of December dummy with attendance rate in July suggests that schools with higher 
initial attendance were likely to see a smaller decline in daily participation in December. There is 
insignificant impact of other school characteristics on attendance rates. 
The program‟s impact on aggregate attendance rate could be masking variation in its 
effect across grades and gender. The first five columns in Table 3, therefore, show the results for 
the average monthly attendance rate of boys in grades 1 to 5 while the next five show the effect 
on attendance rate of girls. The coefficient on the DID estimate is insignificant across all grades 
for  boys.  The  point  estimate  for  grade  1  boys  is  positive  but  imprecisely  estimated.  The 
attendance rate of girls in grade 1 in treatment schools is higher by 12.4 percentage points due to 
the implementation of the cooked meal program after July as indicated by the DID coefficient in 
row  one.  The  DID  coefficient  is  insignificant  for  girls  in  all  other  grades.  Schools  whose 
program participation status changed after July had lower attendance rates of grade 1 boys and 
girls as indicated by the negative coefficient in the second row. Again, the negative coefficients 
on December suggest that there is a time trend in attendance rates across the sample of schools.   16 
While the constants across grades may indicate that attendance rates are lowest in grade 1 for 
both genders, the negative coefficient on December shows that the attendance rates of students 
(more so in the lower grades) decline as the school year progresses. This finding coupled with 
the DID coefficient (in row one) suggests that the presence of cooked school meals may improve 
attendance in lower grades. The impact of other school characteristics is insignificant for boys. 
For girls, the coefficient on the interaction of December with pupil-teacher ratio is negative only 
for grade 3 and significant only at the 10% level. The coefficient on the interaction term with 
functional toilet for girls is positive for all grades and significant for grades 2, 3 and 4. This, 
coupled with the December coefficient, suggests that attendance rates of girls in December in 
schools with a functional toilet were likely to be greater than in schools without this facility. 
B.   Impact of school meals on enrollment  
Table 4 shows the results of the analysis of the effect of introducing cooked meals on school 
enrollment levels. The point estimate of the DID effect for all children is insignificant suggesting 
that implementation of the new program did not lead to higher enrollments. The coefficient on 
December  indicates  that  students  drop  out  as  the  school  year  progresses,  particularly  girls. 
Schools with  higher enrollments  in July were likely to  see lower drop-outs  in  December as 
suggested by the coefficient on December*school enrollment in July in all the columns. The 
coefficients  on  the  month  of  interaction  with  average  school  characteristics  are  insignificant 
throughout.  
A further disaggregation of the data by grade and gender and in Table 5 shows similar 
results. The coefficient on the DID term is insignificant across gender and grades as reported in 
row one of the first column. The December coefficients do not suggest any systematic trend for 
boys but do suggest a strong time trend in enrollment levels which varies across grades for girls. 17 
 
Enrollment levels of girls fall in December, the decline being larger in upper grades as suggested 
by the significantly negative coefficient on December in grades 2 to 5. This may suggest that 
girls in higher grades are more likely to drop out of school than boys in the same grades as the 
school  year  progresses.  Indeed,  while  the  level  of  enrollment  may  fall  in  higher  grades  in 
December  relative  to  July,  the  trend  in  the  attendance  rate  is  opposite  as  suggested  by  the 
coefficient on December for girls in upper grades (see Table 3). Large negative coefficients on 
the December dummy along with the insignificant coefficient on the DID estimates, however, 
raise  a  concern  that  despite  the  introduction  of  cooked  meals  participation,  enrollments  in 
particular, may be declining during the school year. It is difficult to interpret the coefficients on 
the interacted school  characteristics  as  they are  mostly insignificant  and  do not  suggest  any 
systematic relationship with participation of boys and girls. The coefficients on the pupil-teacher 
ratio interaction, however, is significantly positive for boys in grades 1 and 2, suggesting that 
drop-outs in December may be lower in schools that have larger classes at baseline. But this 
coefficient is significantly negative for grade 4 and 5 girls, suggesting the opposite.   
C.  Robustness checks  
In this section we discuss sensitivity analyses of the above results. First, schools in the survey 
region accepted new students only until the end of September. Although parents may enroll their 
child in school even if the school does not provide cooked meals by September in expectations of 
the program being implemented later in the academic year, significant enrollment effects may 
occur if the school begins to serve cooked meals before October. Therefore, as a robustness 
check for enrollment effects, treatment was redefined narrowly as implementation of program by 
September.
16  The impact of the transition to cooked me als on enrollment levels remained  
insignificant. Second, in order for the attendance rate measure to account for any change s in the   18 
enrollment  level  due  to  the  meal  program  and  possibly  biasing  the  program‟s  impact  on 
attendance rates we also ran the analysis for the average level of attendance. The results were 
similar  to  that  for  attendance  rates  but  were  not  significant.  The  coefficients  on  DID  term 
indicated that there may be an increase in the number of girls attending grade 1 by about 1 and 
grade 1 boys by 0.5 student per school day. To conserve space, the full results are not presented 
in the paper but are available upon request. 
D.   Caveats 
The analyses indicate that the cooked meals program significantly improved the attendance rates, 
particularly of girls, but not enrollment levels. The latter result does not necessarily imply that 
school meal programs are not substantially effective in increasing enrollments. Since schools 
were distributing raw food grains in the survey region before transitioning to serving cooked 
meals,  the  results  might  suggest  that  the  subsidy  provided  by  the  latter  scheme  did  not 
dramatically affect enrollment incentives over and above those provided by the raw food grains 
program. This is more apparent from the fact that the difference between the cash value of the 
two programs is marginal (equivalent to the value of ingredients other than food grains used in 
cooked meals) since more than 76% of the cooked meal subsidy consisted of the value of food 
grains.  Given  that  availing  the  subsidy  provided  by  the  cooked  meals  requires  daily  school 
attendance, one would expect the program‟s impact to be more significant on this indicator of 
participation than on enrollments.  
While interpreting these results and drawing policy conclusions a few caveats, however, 
must be kept in mind. First, the point estimates may be imprecisely estimated due to the small 
sample size and/or the downward bias introduced by the estimation strategy as discussed in 
section 4. Using the data from the sample, power calculations show that the sample size in this 19 
 
study will be able to detect a true difference of means of 5.5 percentage points in the attendance 
rate and 33.5 children in enrollment levels  between the control  and treatment  groups at 5% 
significance level with 80% power. Thus, if the true difference-in-differences in the aggregate 
participation  rates  between  the  control  and  treatment  groups  is  small  (particularly  for 
enrollments) it will require a larger sample for detection. Second, the regularity of school meal 
provision improved over the academic year in control schools but the small sample size does not 
allow for analysis by program regularity. The estimates of program impact presented here may 
be biased downwards due to the provision of meals more regularly in months after July in the 
control  schools (i.e. those which were providing meals  in  July and December). Third, since 
parents may have expectations about the program being implemented later in the academic year 
the enrollment figures in July could themselves be high again biasing the program effects in the 
analysis here downwards. 
6       Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  used  school  panel  data  from  a  rural  area  of  India  to  investigate  whether 
transition in a nationally mandated school meal program from provision of raw food grains to 
cooked meals has been successful in improving school participation rates. 
The results indicate that transition to the cooked school meal program  may not have 
improved the enrollment levels over and above the effect which may have been induced by the 
pre-existing program of distributing raw food grains to primary school students. However, the 
transition to provision of cooked meals did lead to an increase in the attendance rate, particularly 
of girls in lower grades. The attendance rate of girls in grade 1 is 12.4 percentage points higher in 
treatment schools. The magnitude of the treatment impact is positive but insignificant for first   20 
grade boys. The program‟s impact on daily attendance decision, thus, may have been greater 
than that for enrollments. 
The results imply that the cooked meal scheme program may be effective in raising the 
daily  school  participation  of  children  in  lower  grades  compared  to  the  off-site  dry  rations 
program. The survey evidence suggests that schools in the survey area were not following the 
official  guideline  of  conditioning  distribution  of  food  grains  on  monthly  attendance  of  each 
student but were instead conditioning on enrollment. The cooked meals program, on the other 
hand, is conditional on enrollment and daily attendance since meals were served on-site. Thus, 
we  see  no  impact  on  enrollments  probably  because  the  new  program  did  not  provide  any 
additional incentives.  
There could be two possible reasons for grade or age effects of daily participation. First, 
since the food transfer was grade or age invariant it effectively gave a proportionately larger 
subsidy to lower grades. The cash value of the cooked school meals (food grains and other 
ingredients including oil, sugar and salt) was equivalent to more than 160% of the annual cost of 
public schooling borne by households in the survey area for a child in grade 1 and 78% of the 
costs for grade 5 as shown in Table 6. Analysis of 24-hour individual food consumption recall 
data collected from children in the same survey area suggests that the total daily calorie intake 
was larger for older children. Thus, the school meal also formed a larger proportion of the total 
daily food intake of younger children. This could be particularly true for girls who are more 
likely to be provided fewer daily nutrients within the household in India (Pitt, Rosenzweig and 
Hassan, 1990). A second, and related reason, for the differential age effect could be that the 
opportunity cost of sending children to school may be higher for older children who are more 21 
 
likely to be engaged in productive labour. Thus the school meal subsidy may significantly affect 
the schooling decisions of those with relatively lower opportunity costs. 
In conclusion, the new scheme affected the attendance decisions of those whose school 
participation rate was on the margin: those whose attendance rates were low in the absence of the 
program and for whom the food transfer significantly lowered the opportunity cost of schooling. 
These results are supported by the evidence from previous survey data and anecdotal evidence on 
the impact of the meal program in India (Dreze and Goyal, 2003; Dreze and Kingdon, 2000). 
These  studies  suggest  that  school  meal  programs  are  particularly  effective  in  increasing  the 
school enrollment rates of first graders. Qualitative data on perceptions of school headmasters 
and parents from this survey also suggests that younger children are more attracted to attending 
school due to the program which makes it easier to ensure that their school participation is more 
regular.  
While the benefits of transitioning to cooked school meals may include improvements in 
daily participation and nutritional intakes of program participants (Afridi, 2009), the implicit 
(viz. effects on quality of teaching) and explicit cost of this program may be higher than raw 
food  grains  distribution.  Any  policy  recommendation,  therefore,  must  involve  a  cost-benefit 
analysis of the two types of school meal programs. Although such a detailed cost-benefit analysis 
is beyond the scope of this paper, there are two broad policy implications of the results in the 
paper. First, targeted school subsidies can be an important policy instrument for making regular 
schooling more desirable for children of resource poor households. A policy recommendation, 
therefore,  is  to  condition  school  transfers  on  attendance  along  with  placing  mechanisms  for 
monitoring attendance records in schools. Second, it is possible that school subsidies, which even 
implicitly target girls, can be effective in improving girls‟ participation in education.    22 
                                                 
1  According to official figures, there are about 150 million enrolled children in nearly 800 
thousand schools throughout the country (Government of India, Department of Education, 2003). 
2 The PROBE Team (1999) report estimates that the average annual  cost of sending a child to a 
rural primary school in 1996 was Rs. 318. This is far from negligible, given that between 1990 -
96 more than 40% of the Indian population lived on less than $1 a day in 1993 PPP terms 
(United Nations, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 2007). 
3 A recent survey conducted in 21 states by the Indian Human Resource Development Ministry 
(Hindustan Times, August 21, 2007) finds that in most north Indian states student attendance 
averages around 60% on a school day in public   primary schools. Duflo, Hanna and Ryan‟s 
(2007)  paper  on  teacher  absenteeism  in  primary  schools  in  Rajasthan  also  suggests  a  daily 
attendance rate of about 60% for students.   
4 Which of these two factors has a greater effect on school attendance is an em pirical question. 
Duflo, Hanna and Ryan (2007) find no significant effect of increased teacher presence on 
students‟ daily attendance in schools in Rajasthan.  Conditional cash subsidy provided under 
Progresa in Mexico lead to a significant effect on enrollment but not attendance (Schultz, 2000).  
5 Human Resource Development Ministry website at http://education.nic.in/mdm/mdmstatus.asp 
6 A few survey studies (Dreze and Goyal, 2003; Government of Ind ia, 2000; Laxmaiah et al., 
1999) have evaluated the impact of cooked school meals in India by comparing enrollment and 
attendance rates across academic years within treatment schools or through a cross -sectional 
comparison of participation rates in treatment and control schools. Although the results mostly 
show success of the program in raising enrollment and attendance rates, especially of girls, the 
estimation  strategies  neither  account  for  the  endogeneity  of  program  placement  nor  the 
concurrent introduction of other public programs which could impact school participation rates.    23 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 To the best of our knowledge, the only school meal evaluation which studies the impact on 
daily attendance is for Bangladesh where school attendance increased by 1.3 days per  month 
(Ahmed, 2004) with the provision of meals.  Vermeersch and Kremer‟s (2005) results are for a 
pre-school feeding program in Kenya. 
8 Districts in India are subdivided into census blocks. In 2001 there were a total of 48 districts 
and 311 census blocks in MP.  
9 Each GP typically consists of 1 to 5 villages, including all the public primary schools therein, 
within its purview. 
10 It is unlikely that a significant proportion of the population was switching between schools in 
response to the implementation of the school meal program. Private primary schools are rare in 
this region and significantly more expensive. 96.9% of the sampled households in the survey had 
enrolled their child in a public primary school within the residing village. Moreover, 97.8% of all 
children currently enrolled in a public primary school had resided with the same household for 
all of the previous 12 months.  
11  In  agrarian  economies  children‟s  daily  attendance may  vary by  agricultural  seasons since 
during harvests children are usually employed either on the family farm or for daily wages on 
someone else‟s land lowering average attendance in schools. But in both July and December 
agricultural activity is low in this rural area, thus, we do not expect the average daily attendance 
of children to be systematically different between the two months.  
12 When the control group includes only those schools not serving cooked meals in both July and 
December, the effects of program transition are similar to the results discussed in section 5. But  
since concerns regarding small sample bias, non -comparability of the treatment and control   24 
                                                                                                                                                             
group due to different time trends and heterogeneity within the control group are greater with 
this definition we do not report these results. 
13 Quoting Supreme Court of India order (2001):  “… Those governments providing dry rations 
instead  of  cooked  meals  must,  within  three  months,  start  providing  cooked  meals  in  all 
government  and  government  assisted  schools  in  half  the  districts  of  the  state  (in  order  of 
poverty), and must within a further period of three months extend the provision of cooked meals 
to the remaining parts of the state.” 
14  The  seat  of  the  GP  president,  in  GPs  where  the  majority  of  the  population  is  socio -
economically disadvantaged (scheduled tribes) , is reserved for an individual belonging to a 
scheduled tribe by the Constitution. Details of this regression analysis are excluded from the 
paper but are available upon request. 
15 Since the visits were during the school lunch hour the teachers had already taken the roll call 
for that day. 
16  A comparison of the  observable characteristics of schools (viz. Table 1) based on the 
definition of treatment as “transition to cooked school meals after July but before October” does 
not show any significant differences between control and treatment schools.    25 
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Table 1: Public Primary School Characteristics 
Note: The treatment group was distributing free food grains in July. The mean tuition reported is the total tuition cost for progressing from grade 1 
to 5 in five years. 
a The proportion of days in the school month that cooked meals were served. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1% 
 
School Characteristics  Treatment Group of Schools 
 (N=39) 
(1) 





(1) – (2) 
Cooked School Meals in July?  No  Yes   
Cooked School Meals in December?  Yes  Yes   
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   Table 2: Impact of School Meal Program on Monthly Attendance Rates in Public Primary Schools 
Variables  All  Boys  Girls 
December*Participation in cooked meal program after July but before December  0.018  0.002  0.024 
  (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.042) 
Participation in cooked meal program after July but before December  -0.045  -0.037  -0.048 
  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.031) 
December  -0.345***  -0.308***  -0.381*** 
  (0.070)  (0.074)  (0.080) 
December*pupil-teacher ratio   0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
December*blackboards per grade  -0.018  0.001  -0.026 
  (0.062)  (0.068)  (0.061) 
December*drinking water on school premises  -0.002  0.005  -0.008 
  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.028) 
December*functional toilet for girls  0.056  0.044  0.075 
  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.057) 
December* school enrollment in July  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
December* school attendance rate in July  0.464***  0.418***  0.505*** 
  (0.080)  (0.086)  (0.092) 
Constant  0.814***  0.815***  0.813*** 
  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
Observations  112  108  108 
R-squared  0.16  0.13  0.16 
Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering on the school reported in parentheses. Missing data for 2 girls only school and 2 boys only 
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Table 3: Impact of School Meal Program on Monthly Attendance Rates in Public Primary Schools by Gender and Grade  
Variables  Boys  Girls 
  Grade 1  Grade 2  Grade 3  Grade 4  Grade 5  Grade 1  Grade 2  Grade 3  Grade 4  Grade 5 
December*Participation in cooked meal 
program after July but before December  0.076  -0.016  0.009  -0.012  -0.058  0.124**  -0.006  -0.014  0.003  -0.048 
  (0.059)  (0.051)  (-0.054)  (0.054)  (0.059)  (0.056)  (0.063)  (0.044)  (0.054)  (0.062) 
Participation in cooked meal program after 
July but before December  -0.123**  -0.035  -0.011  -0.007  0.002  -0.137***  -0.035  -0.038  -0.017  0.009 
  (0.054)  (0.039)  (0.048)  (0.040)  (0.055)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.036)  (0.042)  (0.052) 
December  -0.598***  -0.442***  -0.341**  -0.242**  0.062  -0.483***  -0.431***  -0.166  -0.099  -0.038 
  (0.130)  (0.155)  (0.153)  (0.110)  (0.092)  (0.172)  (0.128)  (0.225)  (0.163)  (0.137) 
December*pupil-teacher ratio  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001*  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
December*blackboards per grade  -0.102  0.004  0.06  0.065  0.091  0.013  0.005  0.086  -0.086  -0.013 
  (0.087)  (0.072)  (0.116)  (0.094)  (0.095)  (0.087)  (0.108)  (0.088)  (0.083)  (0.072) 
December*drinking water on school 
premises  -0.018  0.018  -0.051  0.042  0.030  0.000  0.004  -0.009  -0.024  0.004 
  (0.038)  (0.030)  (0.053)  (0.039)  (0.033)  (0.044)  (0.048)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.032) 
December*functional toilet for girls  0.019  0.004  0.033  0.087  0.065  0.005  0.090*  0.110**  0.109*  0.001 
  (0.050)  (0.086)  (0.066)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.125)  (0.051)  (0.045)  (0.054)  (0.076) 
December* school enrollment in July  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
December* school attendance rate in July  0.802***  0.577***  0.383**  0.286**  0.017  0.601***  0.524***  0.166  0.166  0.243 
  (0.142)  (0.167)  (0.166)  (0.133)  (0.119)  (0.192)  (0.163)  (0.255)  (0.187)  (0.154) 
Constant  0.786***  0.862***  0.822***  0.816***  0.796***  0.785***  0.818***  0.849***  0.834***  0.790*** 
  (0.044)  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.045)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.040) 
Observations  108  108  108  108  108  108  108  108  108  106 
R-squared  0.22  0.17  0.05  0.07  0.08  0.2  0.09  0.07  0.03  0.1 
Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering on the school reported in parentheses. Missing data for no girl enrollment in grade 5. 
* Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1% 
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      Table 4: Impact of School Meal Program on Enrollment Levels in Public Primary Schools 
Variables    All  Boys  Girls 
December*Participation in cooked meal program after July but before December  -10.026  -4.122  -5.904 
  (17.395)  (8.382)  (10.111) 
Participation in cooked meal program after July but before December  10.302  3.4  6.902 
  (17.597)  (9.644)  (9.746) 
December  -93.263***  -33.873  -59.39*** 
  (14.875)  (21.629)  (19.251) 
December*pupil-teacher ratio  0.003  0.098  -0.095 
  (0.026)  (0.107)  (0.094) 
December*blackboards per grade  3.356  5.167  -1.811 
  (2.884)  (12.995)  (12.818) 
December*drinking water on school premises  0.232  -3.274  3.506 
  (1.316)  (4.684)  (4.264) 
December*functional toilet for girls  2.072  4.190  -2.119 
  (3.527)  (4.865)  (3.464) 
December* school enrollment in July  0.951***  0.375***  0.576*** 
  (0.028)  (0.101)  (0.091) 
December* school attendance rate in July  -0.058  -11.691  11.632 
  (4.513)  (23.53)  (21.258) 
Constant  94.647***  49.882***  44.765*** 
  (15.052)  (8.106)  (7.178) 
Observations  112  112  112 
R-squared  0.48  0.31  0.36 
     Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering on the school reported in parentheses.  
     * Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1% 
 
 
   34 
 
Table 5: Impact of School Meal Program on Enrollment Levels in Public Primary Schools by Gender and Grade  
Variables  Boys  Girls 
  Grade 1  Grade 2  Grade 3  Grade 4  Grade 5  Grade 1  Grade 2  Grade 3  Grade 4  Grade 5 
December*Participation  in  cooked  meal 
program after July but before December  -0.777  0.086  -2.104  -0.679  -0.649  -0.994  -1.181  -1.230  -1.521  -0.979 
  (2.102)  (1.599)  (2.005)  (1.813)  (1.621)  (2.008)  (2.150)  (2.195)  (1.887)  (2.436) 
Participation  in  cooked  meal  program 
after July but before December  0.350  1.100  1.335  0.428  0.187  -0.680  1.189  1.519  3.275*  1.600 
  (2.391)  (1.895)  (2.132)  (2.274)  (2.051)  (2.323)  (2.240)  (2.320)  (1.836)  (2.404) 
December  -3.430  -11.164*** -7.665*  -7.702  -3.912  -3.406  -15.724*** -14.597*** -11.691*** -13.971*** 
  (7.703)  (3.801)  (3.874)  (5.341)  (5.009)  (6.490)  (4.174)  (5.440)  (3.287)  (4.157) 
December*pupil-teacher ratio  0.061*  0.048**  0.013  -0.026  0.002  0.012  -0.006  0.004  -0.042*  -0.062* 
  (0.032)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.022)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.031) 
December*blackboards per grade  2.408  -0.490  6.241*  -2.614  -0.378  4.184  -1.573  1.203  -3.962  -1.663 
  (4.567)  (2.955)  (3.305)  (2.989)  (3.535)  (3.568)  (3.110)  (3.679)  (2.720)  (3.627) 
December*drinking  water  on  school 
premises  -0.009  -0.422  3.212**  -1.034  1.403  0.252  1.567  0.724  0.442  0.520 
  (1.782)  (1.270)  (1.254)  (1.338)  (1.201)  (1.242)  (1.226)  (1.213)  (1.243)  (1.433) 
December*functional toilet for girls  -1.775  2.269  4.531  -1.525  0.690  -4.344***  2.636  1.746  0.073  -2.230 
  (1.210)  (1.891)  (3.680)  (2.785)  (0.898)  (1.202)  (1.820)  (1.601)  (2.021)  (1.495) 
December* July school enrollment   0.068**  0.060***  0.072***  0.108***  0.066***  0.091***  0.118***  0.106***  0.131***  0.130*** 
  (0.028)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.016)  (0.028) 
December* July school attendance   -8.763  3.306  -2.214  0.467  -4.486  -9.321  6.116  3.935  4.719  6.184 
  (9.077)  (4.250)  (3.401)  (5.387)  (5.644)  (7.456)  (4.586)  (5.834)  (3.876)  (3.892) 
Constant  11.471***  8.824***  9.588*** 10.059***  9.941*** 11.706***  8.529***  9.353***  7.059***  8.118*** 
  (1.968)  (1.545)  (1.636)  (1.836)  (1.748)  (2.015)  (1.747)  (1.884)  (1.123)  (1.465) 
Observations  112  112  112  112  112  112  112  112  112  112 
R-squared  0.26  0.27  0.3  0.24  0.19  0.35  0.32  0.32  0.34  0.22 
Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering on the school reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1% 
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             Table 6: Annual Household Expenditure on Public Schooling of an Individual Child (Rs. per annum) 









































































Cash  value  of  cooked 
meals  as  %  of  annual 
schooling cost 
┼ 
161.43  129.41  104.78  93.19  78.04 













Note: Standard deviations reported in parentheses. 
┼ Cash value of cooked meal includes the market value of wheat (Rs. 0.70 per 100 grams) and the cost of ingredients (Rs. 0.255 
per student per school day). There are approximately 200 school days each academic year. With each student receiving 100 
grams of wheat per school day the annual cash value of the program is Rs. 191 per student across all grades in 2003-04 prices. 
The tuition costs reported here are based on the response of households while in Table 1 it is based on school level data. 
Source: The data are based on a sample survey conducted in January-February, 2004 of 905 children enrolled in a public 
primary school and residing within 615 households in the 41 villages in the survey area. 
 
 